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Justice and Feelings: Toward a New Era in Justice
Research
David De Cremer1,3 and Kees van den Bos2
In this special issue, the relationship between feelings and justice and its con-
sequences are highlighted. Five articles discuss the role that affect, feelings, and
emotions play in justice processes across a variety of social settings. In the
present introductory article, the position of past and present justice research in
relationship to these topics is briefly reviewed. In addition, reasons are outlined
to show why a focus on these issues may be pivotal for a better understanding of
social justice and how this may pave the way for a new, more process-oriented
era in social justice research, focusing more on ‘‘hot’’ cognitive aspects as they
pertain to social justice concerns.
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Justice is essential to our social functioning as is indicated by the fact
that the concept of justice (as well as its violation) often dominates our daily
experiences and discussions (e.g., Finkel, 2001; Folger, 1984). Indeed, people
often talk about the good and bad things they encounter in their social
interactions and frame them as instances of justice versus injustice. Instances
of justice take a variety of forms and researchers have throughout the last
few decades devoted much attention to distinguishing among different
‘‘types’’ of justice (e.g., Bies & Moag, 1986; Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005;
Thibaut & Walker, 1975). More precisely, justice involves issues of
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distribution, treatment, formal and informal decision-making procedures,
and so forth. This variety of justice instances has been reflected in the
scientific use of concepts such as distributive, procedural, and interactional
justice. Concerns about social justice go back to ancient moral philosophers
like Plato and Socrates (Rawls, 1971), so by now it is no surprise that we
have accumulated an impressive amount of studies addressing a variety of
justice issues (for reviews, see, e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; De Cremer
& Tyler, 2005; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005;
Miller, 1999; Tyler & Smith, 1998; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002).
All these studies have shown that social justice reveals important conse-
quences and that social psychological processes and factors play an important
role. Indeed, the observation of justice concerns (as we encounter them in our
daily experiences) has been shown to emerge also in more controlled labora-
tory settings, so that we are now in a position to focus more directly on the
social psychological processes that explain why people direct attention to
justice and how they use information about justice (Van den Bos, 2001). As
such, research on social psychology is now in a position to demonstrate that
social-cognitive and motivational processes underlie the formation of justice
judgments and reactions toward justice versus injustice (De Cremer & Tyler,
2005; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). Thus, it is clear that justice matters and that
people care about justice for a variety of reasons (i.e., people may even defend
the view that justice is omnipresent and that the pursuit of justice is in itself a
guiding and moral directive in our social lives; Montada, 2003).
However, it is fair to note that by assuming that a justice motive is
simply present, less attention is devoted to the initial psychological processes
that determine whether people evaluate fairness or not, or, in other words, to
the processes that make us understand why people evaluate instances of
justice or injustice in the first place (Lerner, 2003). As noted earlier, social
psychological research has shown that certain deliberative and motivational
processes guide evaluations of justice, but, in our view this approach does
not emphasize sufficiently that the issue of determining justice or injustice is
often a matter of intuition and feeling. In making this claim, we thus agree
with the view of emotion researchers that ‘‘openness to feelings is a useful
and even necessary, adjunct to rationality and to effective social thinking
(Damasio, 1994)’’ (Forgas, 2000, p. 1). In the present special issue, we focus
our attention on the role that feelings play in the social psychology of justice.
Feelings can be referred to as phenomenological states that have an affective
or experiential dimension that is reflected in terms of the emotions that
people feel (e.g., anger, sadness, joy, and so forth; see Watson, 2000).
Thus, one specific psychological seems to have been ignored in empir-
ical justice research is the role of feelings. This observation is not new, as
illustrated by a rapidly growing number of quotes by justice researchers
stressing the importance of emotions. For example, with respect to the status
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of emotions in justice research, Weiss et al. (1999) argue that, ‘‘the relative
lack of empirical research assessing emotional reactions to conditions of
unfairness is a serious omission.’’ (p. 786,), whereas Bies and Tripp (2002)
note; ‘‘to understand justice in organizations, one must understand the
events that arouse the sense of injustice – the emotions of injustice’’ (pp.
204–205). Moreover, with respect to the role that emotions play, Barclay
et al. (2005, p. 629) very recently observed that, ‘‘although previous justice
theories and research suggest emotions are part of the relationship between
the experience of injustice and the tendency to retaliate ...little empirical
research has examined the mediating role of emotion.’’
Although the worries of these researchers seems to indicate that more
and more attention will be directed to the emotional basis of justice, it is
disappointing to see that this subject does take a central role in theoretical
accounts of justice, but that currently still few attempts are undertaken to
translate researchers’ conceptual thinking on justice and emotions into the
practice of scientific studies. As we mentioned already, a closer focus on the
relationship between emotions and justice seems warranted, particularly if
one looks briefly at the history of human justice and morality.
Philosophers such as Aristotle and Hume already emphasized the role
that emotions play in affecting deliberative processing of justice and
morality issues in our social environment (e.g., Hume, 1739/1992; Lyons,
1999). These philosophical ideas have to be seen in the perspective of the
debate about whether justice and morality have a rational or a more intuitive
basis (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Kant, 1959). In those days, rationalists assumed that
our ability to cognitively deliberate social information differentiates us from
other species and makes us superior, also in a moral way. In this process,
emotions were sometimes seen as having an undesirable influence on our
cognitions and way of thinking about morality and justice. Nevertheless, the
discussion about the valued role of emotions continued and was also picked
up in the 20th century when Adams (1965), a management researcher,
introduced equity theory. In this theory, it was explicitly acknowledged that
people could feel anger and resentment when being awarded in an unfair and
disadavantageous manner. Around the same time, the sociologist Homans
(1961) also discussed the issue of distributing outcomes and rewards and
emphasized the role of anger and guilt. Despite these references to emotional
influences most justice research (that was stirred very much by the work of
Adams) remained a focus on attitudinal and behavioral reactions. In the
1980s and 1990s the work of Bies (1987) showed that the sense of injustice
led people to experience intense emotional states that one could not easily
relieve, which Folger and Cropanzano (1998) referred to as moral outrage.
In the present special issue, we thus focus our attention on the role of
the experience of emotions when it comes to issues of social justice. We
hasten to add, however, that our promotion of a more emotional perspective
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on justice issues does not imply that cognition does not play a role. In fact,
there is an abundance of evidence available in social psychology demon-
strating that both cognition and affect often interact in predicting human
behavior (Forgas, 2000) and justice judgments (Van den Bos, 2003). Also,
evolutionary psychology sees both psychological components as interrelated
as indicated by their idea that emotions are an important component of our
cognitive architecture responsible for directing and guiding our actions
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). Thus, it is not our intention to claim that cog-
nition does not play a role. On the contrary, we think that more process-
oriented research is needed in order to better understand how people form
justice judgments (Van den Bos & Lind, 2002), and hence we would applaud
a special issue on the social-cognitive aspects of justice judgment processes
as well. This said, we also think it is important to simultaneously stress
several reasons why a focus on emotions and feelings is also needed.
First, because much justice research had (and still has) a strong focus on
behavioral consequences (e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996), it follows
logically to include a focus on emotions. That is, prior justice research has
shown that negative emotions instigate actions such as protest, revenge,
absenteeism, and turnover (Bies & Tripp, 2002; Griffin, O’ Leary-Kelly, &
Collins, 1998; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). This effect of emotions on behavior
has also been articulated in the affective events theory (Weiss & Cropanzano,
1996) that argues that emotions can affect behavior directly (affect-driven
actions) or indirectly (judgment-driven actions). Further, emotions are
evaluative states although that are associated with some object, person, or
event of relatively short duration (Frijda, 1993; Larsen, et al. 2002), they do
have consequences for people’s actions and behaviors, referred to as action
tendencies (Izard, 1993). Thus, emotions are elicited by external situations
and are subjectively experienced, leading people to determine whether the
emotion has a positive or negative valence, how intense the emotion is
(Russell, 1980), and which discrete form the emotion takes (e.g., anger or
guilt; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Once the valence, intensity, and form of the
discrete emotion are clarified, the experience is connected to a person or
situation, which instigates actions (Frijda, 1993).
Second, as already suggested, justice is not only a judgment but can also
represent an intuition or feeling. Indeed, often people’s judgments of whe-
ther a decision or treatment is fair follows from how they feel about the
social instance at hand; that is, they seem to experience justice first and then
make up their mind about it (see also Haidt, 2001 for a similar line of
reasoning with respect to the issue of morality). In a similar vein, Chebat
and Slusarczyk (2005, p. 665) recently noted that ‘‘individuals do not cal-
culate justice. They rather experience a justice-related emotion and react to
their emotion.’’ Thus, in line with these authors, we believe that identifying
the role of emotions in justice can help us in highlighting the subjective and
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intuitive nature of justice judgments in general and in specific situations. In
fact, instances of injustice may first activate some kind of ‘‘emotional
deliberation’’ before judgments, decisions, and actions are given shape.
Third, as indicated earlier, discrete emotions such as anger and frus-
tration are evoked by persons, situations, and other social events. The elic-
itation of these discrete emotions means that they help us to appraise or
evaluate the situation at hand. Indeed, Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein
(2004, p. 337) note that discrete emotions elicit specific appraisals that form
‘‘an implicit lens for interpreting subsequent situations.’’ Thus, social situ-
ations and events receive meaning through this appraisal process. As a result,
depending on the specific emotion evoked, situations can be seen as more
versus less unfair. To date, not much attention has been given to emotion-
related influences on the justice judgment process (for some exceptions to
this statement, see, e.g., De Cremer, 2006; Sinclair & Mark, 1991, 1992; Van
den Bos, 2003). Mikula et al. (1998, p. 771) also noted that ‘‘injustice or
unfairness are rarely mentioned explicitly by appraisal theorists, whereas
Ellsworth and Scherer (2003) more recently have noted that an important
social dimension that may elicit discrete emotions includes the evaluation of
justice or equity. From this perspective, these authors suggest that justice in
itself may serve as an evaluative standard or appraisal that may shape
emotional reactions in terms of form, valence, and intensity. Clearly, the role
of discrete emotions in the psychology of justice needs to be taken into
account.
It seems clear that justice researchers have to take responsibility to
include emotional expressions of people’s feelings (implicit, explicit, as a
dependent or independent variable and so forth) into their empirical
enterprises in order to further refine and deepen our understanding of the
phenomenon that we refer to as social justice. In the present special issue we
brought together a series of papers that address the relationship between
feelings and justice in a variety of social settings. These authors all review
relevant research focusing on the emotional basis of justice and the possible
consequences of this relationship. Interestingly, although our authors
approach this topic from different backgrounds (social psychology, man-
agement, economics, morality, and philosophy) they arrive at quite similar
conclusions, namely that justice and emotions have to be seen as closely
connected.
The first paper by Tripp, Bies, and Aquino focuses on how emotions
play a role in determining actions as a result of injustice in the workplace.
According to these authors, acts of injustice can also be repaired in a positive
way (i.e., related to issues of reconciliation and forgiveness) rather than in
negative ways, such as taking revenge. Moreover, this paper sheds a clear
view on how managers should deal with injustice and possibly vengeful acts
committed in the workplace.
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The second paper, by van Winden, discusses recent research in the field
of economics addressing the role of emotions in interdependent negotiation
situations. In doing this, the author reviews experimental findings on the
‘‘power-to-take’’ game and focuses on how fairness is defined and
approached by economists as well as which emotions (e.g., shame, guilt) play
a role in negotiations. This article also provides insightful information about
how economists have looked at emotions in the past and how their current
perspective seems to change (thereby promoting a useful collaboration
between psychology and economics; see also De Cremer et al., 2006).
The third paper, by Stouten, De Cremer, and Van Dijk, focuses on the
emotional and retributive implications of violations of coordination rules in
symmetric public good dilemmas. The paper notes that research examining
emotional and retributive reactions to violations of the equality rule by a
fellow group member reveal that equality indeed is related to people’s per-
sonal values and of what they consider to be fair. The paper further states
that a violation of the equality rule results in emotional reactions, and these
emotional experiences encourage further retributive actions. Furthermore,
the authors describe the different reactions to equality violation as a func-
tion of three features: (1) motives to use equality, (2) attributions for
explaining the violation, and (3) the honesty of the given explanation.
The fourth paper, by Opotow and McClelland, discusses hate from a
variety of analytical and scientific viewpoints, including psychoanalytic,
social psychological, and criminal justice literatures. Following these view-
points the paper proposes a theory of hate that is interdisciplinary and spans
levels of analysis. Their theoretical development has strong implications for
how we may broaden our thinking about hate, and how we should study
hate.
The fifth paper, by Haidt and Graham, focuses on the possibility that
‘‘morality opposes justice’’ and suggests that conservatives may have moral
intuitions that liberals may not recognize. More specifically, the authors note
that researchers in moral psychology and social justice have agreed that
morality is about matters of harm, rights, and justice. As a result of this
conceptualization of morality, conservative opposition to social justice
programs has appeared to be immoral and has been explained as a product
of various non-moral processes. Haidt and Graham argue, however, that the
moral domain is usually much broader, encompassing many more aspects of
social life and valuing traditional institutions as much or more than indi-
vidual liberties. The authors go on to present theoretical and empirical
reasons for believing that there are in fact five psychological systems that
provide the foundations for the world’s many moral codes. The five foun-
dations are psychological preparations for caring about and reacting emo-
tionally to harm, reciprocity (including justice, fairness, and rights), ingroup,
hierarchy, and purity. According to Haidt and Graham, political liberals
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have moral intuitions primarily based upon the first two foundations, and
therefore misunderstand the moral motivations of political conservatives,
who generally rely upon all five foundations.
Taken together, the five articles included in this special issue on justice
and feelings take different angles and very different perspectives. With this
special issue we hope to have contributed to what, in addition to more
process-oriented studies, is an important subject for future social justice
research, namely the study of justice and feelings.
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